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FINANCIAL REGULATION: 2014 Q2
The author of this article is Juan Carlos Casado Cubillas of the Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research.
This article summarises the considerable amount of financial legislation adopted in 2014 Q2.
One of the most noteworthy pieces of legislation is the Law on regulation, supervision 
and solvency of credit institutions, which continues the process of adapting Spanish law 
to European Union legislation on the supervision and solvency of financial institutions.
The European Central Bank (ECB) brought in new regulations of some significance on: 1) the 
implementation of the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) between the ECB and national competent authorities (NCAs); 2) the amendment of 
regulations on the Eurosystem’s monetary policy instruments and procedures; 3) domestic 
asset and liability management operations, and limits on the remuneration of deposits; 4) the 
updating of powers to impose sanctions as a central bank; 5) the implementation of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Supervisory Board and of the Administrative Board of Review, to supplement 
the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, and 6) the establishment of preparatory measures for the 
collection of granular credit data by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).
Rules and regulations of some substance in the financial sphere were also published in the 
area of European legislation: 1) the updating of the deposit guarantee systems of credit 
institutions; 2) the implementation of a uniform framework of rules and procedures for the 
restructuring and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms; 3) a broad set of 
specific rules applicable to the own funds of financial institutions; 4) new regulations on 
markets in financial instruments which, among other aspects, strengthen investor protection; 
5) the updating of the common regulatory framework in the area of operations involving 
market abuse and the establishment of a set of measures to punish this type of operation 
with criminal sanctions; 6) the amendment of European legislation on the taxation of savings 
income in the form of interest payments to resolve certain shortcomings of the previous 
legislation, and 7) the implementation of the regulations on European venture capital funds.
Two pieces of legislation were approved on the securities market. Firstly, a CNMV circular 
implements the European Union’s legislation on the supervision and solvency of investment 
firms by using some of the regulatory options provided for therein; and secondly, another 
CNMV Circular sets out the requirements on internal organisation and control functions of 
entities providing investment services.
Finally, the changes in the new regulation on the prevention of money laundering and 
terrorist financing are discussed along with the temporary measures for the gradual 
adaptation of insurance and reinsurance companies to European Union legislation.
The contents of this article are set out in Table 1.
The Spanish version of this article discusses the same legislation in greater detail.
Law 10/2014 of 26 June 2014 (BOE [Official State Gazette] of 27 June 2014) on the 
regulation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions was published and came into 
force on 28 June 2014 (hereinafter, the Law), except for certain specific provisions 
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referring to Securities Market Law 24/1988 of 29 July 1988 which will be enforceable 
from 31 October 2014. Its main purpose is to continue the transposition commenced by 
Royal Decree-Law 14/2013 of 29 November 20131, on urgent measures for the 
adaptation of Spanish law to EU supervisory and solvency regulations for financial 
institutions, especially, to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 20132, and to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 20133.
1  See “Financial Regulation: 2013 Q4”, Economic Bulletin, January 2014, Banco de España, pp. 67-71.
2  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories. 
See “Financial Regulation: 2013 Q2”, Economic Bulletin, July-August 2013, Banco de España, pp. 53-66.
3  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Council and of the European Parliament of 26 June 2013 (OJ L of 27 June 2013) 
on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
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Inter alia, the Law regulates general aspects of the legal framework governing access to 
the status of credit institution; the functioning of its governing bodies, and the supervisory 
and disciplinary instruments that the authorities are to use.
The Law is subdivided into the following sections:
The Law includes a set of general provisions concerning the legal framework applicable to 
credit institutions. It therefore defines what constitutes a credit institution, establishes the 
nature of the business reserved exclusively to them, and the sources of the legal rules 
governing them. It also regulates other points, which are inherently associated with the 
characteristics of credit institutions, such as the system for granting and revoking 
authorisation; the rules on significant shareholdings; the suitability of members of the 
board of directors or equivalent body and incompatibilities to which they are subject, the 
rules of corporate governance and remuneration policy.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
   amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the 
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial 
conglomerate, repealing Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006, on the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions.
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Although the regulations on solvency are determined by Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of 
26 June 2013, which has already been in force since 1 January 20144, the Law includes the 
provisions on the matter which are to be included in Spanish legislation. These include 
credit institutions’ self-assessment of their capital relative to the risks they assume, to 
ensure that they have in place sound, effective and comprehensive strategies and 
processes to continuously assess and maintain the amounts, types and distribution of 
internal capital that they consider adequate to cover the nature and level of the risks to 
which they are or might be exposed.
Additionally, it sets out a series of requirements additional to those for Common Equity Tier 
1 – the so-called capital buffers – which allow supervisors to demand higher levels of 
capital than those established in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of 26 June 2013. Specifically, 
five types of buffer are defined:
1)  Capital conservation buffer for unexpected losses, comprising Common 
Equity Tier 1 equivalent to 2.5% of the total amount of the risk exposure. 
Transitional arrangements are established according to the following timetable: 
0.625% in 2016; 1.25% in 2017; 1.875% in 2018; and 2.5% as of 2019.
SOLVENCY OF CREDIT 
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4  Under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Tier 1 capital is the sum of Common Equity Tier 1 (basically comprising ordinary 
capital and reserves), and additional Tier 1 capital (comprising hybrid instruments). The Regulation also establishes 
a series of own funds requirements for 2014 in the following ranges: 1) a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of 
between 4% and 4.5%, and 2) a Tier 1 capital ratio of between 5.5% and 6% that must be specified by the 
competent authorities. In the case at hand, in CBE 2/2014, 31 January 2014, the Banco de España laid down that 
institutions must, at all times, comply with a Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of 4.5% with a Tier 1 capital ratio of 6%.
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2)  Specific counter-cyclical capital buffer, in terms of Common Equity Tier 1, 
calculated specifically for each institution or group, equivalent to the total 
amount of the risk exposure multiplied by a specific percentage. This 
percentage will be the weighted average of the percentages for counter-
cyclical buffers applicable in the territories in which the institution’s relevant 
credit exposures are located, such that up to 2.5% of the total weighted 
exposures may be required. The same transitional arrangements are 
established as for the capital conservation buffer.
3)  Capital conservation buffer for global systemically important financial institutions 
(G-SIFIs) of between 1% and 3.5% of the total risk exposure, depending on the 
systemic importance of the institution concerned. As in previous cases, transitional 
arrangements are applicable to these percentages according to the following 
timetable: 25% in 2016; 50% in 2017; 75% in 2018; and 100% as of 2019.
4)  Buffer for other systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), giving the 
Banco de España a degree of discretion as to whether to require certain 
institutions to set aside this buffer, which may be as much as 2% of the total 
risk exposure, bearing in mind the criteria used to identify SIFIs.
5)  Common Equity Tier 1 systemic risk buffer in order to prevent or avoid non-
cyclical long-term systemic or macroprudential risks that could prompt a 
shock in the financial system with serious negative consequences for the 
system and the real economy. 
To address possible non-compliance with the precepts regulating the capital buffer rules, 
a system based on restrictions on distributions has been devised, along with a capital 
conservation plan, applicable as of 2016.
The capital conservation plan must be approved by the Banco de España, which may 
require an increase in own funds, or impose stricter restrictions on distributions if it sees fit.
Criteria are also introduced that are to be taken into account by the Banco de España to 
set possible liquidity requirements in the framework of the review of strategies, procedures 
and systems implemented by institutions in compliance with the solvency rules, which will 
be enforced as of 2016.
In the event of breach of the solvency regulations, the Banco de España has been given 
the power and authority to intervene in the entity’s business, such as introducing stricter 
capital or provisions requirements, or restricting the distribution of dividends. If the 
situation is exceptionally serious, the Banco de España may even take control of the 
institution and replace its governing bodies.
Under the legislation currently in force the Banco de España has been designated as the 
supervisory authority for credit institutions. It has therefore been granted the powers and 
authority necessary to perform this role, the scope and aims of its supervisory activities 
have been defined, and it has been granted authority to take the necessary measures to 
ensure compliance with solvency regulations. 
Moreover, given that credit institutions conduct their business in an increasingly integrated 
environment, particularly within Europe, the regulations also cover the Banco de España’s 
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
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dealings with other supervisory authorities, and in particular the European Banking 
Authority (EBA). In this context, once the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has come 
fully into effect in the European Union, the Banco de España will have to perform its credit 
institution supervisory duties in cooperation with, and without prejudice to the competences 
directly assigned to, the ECB, by virtue of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of the Council of 
15 October 2013,5 which entrusts the ECB with specific tasks concerning policies relating 
to the prudential supervision of credit institutions.
The Banco de España will draw up an annual programme of supervision for all the credit 
institutions subject to supervision, paying particular attention to the following institutions 
(among others): 1) those whose results in the stress tests or process of supervisory review 
and evaluation indicate the existence of significant risks to their financial soundness or 
reveal possible non-compliance with solvency regulations; and 2) those that represent a 
systemic risk to the financial system.
Additionally, a series of intervention measures or the replacement of the administrative and 
management body is provided for in certain cases: 1) in the cases envisaged in Law 9/2012 
of 14 November 2012 on restructuring and resolution of credit institutions; 2) when there 
are substantiated indications that the credit institution is in an exceptionally serious 
situation, that may jeopardise its stability, liquidity or solvency; and 3) when it acquires a 
significant stake in a credit institution without observing the rules provided for in this Law, 
or when there are substantiated grounds for believing that the influence exerted by its 
owners may be contrary to the institution’s sound and prudential management, or seriously 
damage its financial situation.
Finally, the Law delimits the Banco de España’s supervisory powers in relation to branches 
whose parent entities have been authorised and are supervised in another Member State. 
The Law details the information that institutions are to provide under the regulations 
currently in force, leaving for subsequent implementation a review of the accounting rules, 
standard form of financial statements, and the consolidated financial statements credit 
institutions are to comply with, in accordance with European regulations and other 
applicable company law.
Additionally, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, it is obligatory to submit the 
Prudentially Relevant Information document to the Banco de España at least once a year 
so as to enable monitoring of compliance with the minimum own funds requirements 
envisaged in the solvency regulations. This document therefore includes specific 
information on the institution’s financial situation, risk control, internal organisation and 
situation, etc.
Finally, another new feature is the obligation upon credit institutions to submit an annual 
banking report, the contents of which are described in the Law, which is to be included as 
an annex to its audited financial statements.
The penalty system applicable to credit institutions follows the model defined by Law 
26/1988 of 29 July 19886 on the discipline and intervention of credit institutions, repealed 
by this Law. The opportunity has also been taken to introduce the amendments necessary 
INSTITUTIONS’ REPORTING AND 
DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
SYSTEM OF PENALTIES
5  See “Financial regulation: 2013 Q4”, Economic Bulletin, January 2014, Banco de España, pp. 71-74.
6  See “Regulación financiera: tercer trimestre de 1988”, Boletín Económico, October 1988, Banco de España, pp. 56-58.
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to implement Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 into Spanish law, basically as regards 
the inclusion of new types of penalties and the modification of the amount of the applicable 
infringements and the way in which they are calculated. It also covers public disclosure, 
given that, depending on the severity of the infringement, it will be reported in the 
administrative records on credit institutions and their senior officials, in the Mercantile 
Register, and even in the Official State Gazette (BOE) if the penalties are imposed for very 
serious infringements.
Finally, a number of technical modifications have been introduced in order to update some 
of the precepts to the rules on general administrative procedure currently in force.
The classification in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, 26 June 2013, of preference shares as 
additional Tier 1 capital for the credit institutions issuing them has been introduced into 
Spanish legislation, subject to the conditions established in the Regulation. Additionally, 
the requirements under Spanish legislation set out in Law 13/1985 on investment ratios, 
own funds and reporting requirements for financial intermediaries have been maintained 
and some new features added. These include the possibility of their being listed on 
multilateral trading  facilities (MTFs) or other organised markets as well as on regulated 
markets. The applicable tax treatment is extended to preference shares issued by listed 
entities that are not credit institutions and companies resident in Spain or a territory of the 
European Union not considered a tax haven, and whose voting rights are held in full, 
directly or indirectly, by listed entities other than credit institutions, provided that certain 
requirements detailed in the regulation are met. This new framework will apply to issues as 
of the date of entry into force of the Law on 28 June 2014.
Pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of the Council of 15 October 2013, the Banco 
de España, as the national competent authority, will form part of the SSM along with the 
ECB and other competent national authorities. In the SSM framework the Banco de 
España will act under the principle of loyal cooperation with the ECB and provide the 
assistance necessary for it to perform its role pursuant to the Regulation and its 
implementing provisions.
A number of amendments have been made to Law 26/2013, 27 December 2013,7 on 
savings banks and banking foundations. Under the framework governing banking 
foundations, the rules for the banking foundations’ ‘protectorates’ have been defined, 
assigning competence over them to either the State or the Autonomous Region 
depending on the scope of their principal activity and their share of ownership of the 
credit institution.8
On a separate issue, foundations originating in a savings bank that maintain a shareholding 
in a credit institution that reaches the levels envisaged in Law 26/2013 (i.e. that, directly or 
indirectly, it comes to 10% of the entity’s capital or voting rights or allows it to appoint or 
dismiss any members of the governing body), will be converted into banking foundations 
within nine months (previously six months) of the entry into force of Law 26/2013, which 
was on 29 December 2013.
CHANGES TO THE LEGAL RULES 
ON PREFERENCE SHARES
INTEGRATION OF THE BANCO 
DE ESPAÑA IN THE SINGLE 
SUPERVISORY MECHANISM
SAVINGS BANKS AND BANKING 
FOUNDATIONS
7  See “Financial regulation: 2013 Q4,” Economic Bulletin, January 2014, Banco de España, pp. 83-89.
8  The protectorate is responsible for ensuring the legality of banking foundations’ constitution and operations, 
without prejudice to the role assigned to the Banco de España. Depending on the foundation’s scope of activity, 
the protectorate will be exercised by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness or the corresponding 
Autonomous Region.
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The Law now stipulates that individuals who are simultaneously members both of the 
board of directors of a savings bank and of the board of directors of the banking institution 
through which the latter exercises its activity as a credit institution may continue to hold 
both posts simultaneously up to no later than 30 June 2016.9
As envisaged in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, 26 June 2013, the Banco de España may 
exempt credit institutions forming part of an institutional protection system from compliance 
with individual solvency requirements under the Regulation when this system is constituted 
through a contractual agreement between various credit institutions and complies with the 
requirements of the Regulation,10 and those of the national regulations.
The composition of the management board of the Deposit Guarantee Fund, regulated 
under Royal Decree Law 16/2011 of 14 October 201111, is amended to include 
representatives of the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness, and of 
Finance and Public Administration, as the institution is included within the scope of 
fiscal consolidation. Specifically, it will comprise eleven members, a representative of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness, a representative of the Ministry 
of Finance and Public Administration, four members appointed by the Banco de España 
and five by the representative associations of member credit institutions (three by 
associations representing the banks, one by the savings banks and one by the credit 
cooperatives).12
In relation to individuals or legal entities which, not being registered in any of the legally 
required administrative registers of financial institutions, offer loans, deposits or 
financial services of any kind to the public, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Competitiveness, ex officio or at the behest of the Banco de España or any other 
authority, shall be empowered to: 1) require them, directly or through the Banco de 
España, to provide any accounting or other information regarding their financial 
activities, with the level of detail and frequency considered appropriate; and 2) carry 
out, directly or through the Banco de España, any inspections deemed necessary for 
the purposes of clarifying any aspects of the financial activities of these persons or 
entities and their compatibility with the legal system or confirm the accuracy of the 
information referred to in the previous section.
The Law makes wide-ranging amendments to Law 24/1988 of 28 July 1988 on the securities 
market in order to bring investment firms within the scope of the prudential supervision 
system envisaged for credit institutions under Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013.
Thus, members of investment firms’ boards of directors within the scope of application of 
Directive 2013/36/EU, 26 June 2013, are subject to the same rules on corporate governance 
and directors’ suitability and incompatibilities as those for credit institutions.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
INSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
SYSTEMS
DEPOSIT GUARANTEE FUND
SUPERVISION OF ENTITIES NOT 
ON ADMINISTRATIVE REGISTERS
AMENDMENTS TO SECURITIES 
MARKET LEGISLATION
Solvency rules and supervision 
of investment firms
  9  The compatibility of each member was to be maintained until Law 26/2013 came into force at the banking 
institution, and in no case later than 30 June 2016.
10  The requirements under Article 10 of the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 are the following: 1) the commitments of 
the central body and member entities constitute joint and several obligations or the commitments of the member 
entities are fully guaranteed by the central body; 2) the solvency and liquidity of the central body and all the 
member entities are supervised as a whole based on the consolidated accounts of these entities; and 3) the 
management of the central body is empowered to give instructions to the management of the member entities.
11  See “Financial regulation: 2011 Q4,” Economic Bulletin, January 2012, Banco de España, pp. 126-128.
12  It previously comprised twelve members, six appointed by the Banco de España and six by the representative 
associations for the member credit institutions (two by associations representing the banks, two by the savings 
banks, and two by credit cooperatives).
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Although the main legislative instrument concerning investment firms’ solvency is 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of 26 June 2013, certain special features of these institutions 
are regulated. As with credit institutions, the Law obliges investment firms to carry out a 
self-assessment of their levels of capital and liquidity in order to determine whether it is 
necessary to maintain levels of own resources or liquidity higher than those established in 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
Additionally, the CNMV, like the Banco de España, is empowered to require that 
additional Common Equity Tier 1, so called capital buffers, be complied with. 
Nevertheless, the capital buffers system will not be applicable to investment firms that 
do not engage in proprietary trading, insurance of financial instruments or placing of 
financial instruments on a firm commitment basis. In the case of investment firms 
classed as small or medium-sized enterprises, the CNMV may opt not to apply the 
capital conservation buffer or counter-cyclical buffer if it considers it not to pose a threat 
to the stability of the financial system.
The appropriate exercise of these functions by the CNMV requires a degree of 
coordination with other supervisors both nationally and in other countries. Therefore, 
many of the amendments to Law 24/1988, of 28 July 1988, are in response to this need 
for closer coordination.
The system of penalties envisaged for investment firms has also been updated to include 
the relevant infringements and sanctions deriving from breach of the solvency rules.
The Law updates the regulation of central counterparty entities to make it compatible with 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 
201213 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, and its 
implementing regulations.
Improvements have been made to the penalty system applicable to breaches of European 
Union rules on short selling. The rules on the information to be given to investment services 
customers have been broadened where other linked financial products are offered, 
including those, such as mortgage loans, for example, which already have their own rules 
on transparency and customer protection.
The levy charged by the Banco de España to cover tasks relating to the comprehensive 
assessment of credit institutions provided for in Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of the 
Council of 15 October 201314 has been established. 
The Law has also been taken as an opportunity to make ad hoc amendments to a variety 
of other pieces of financial legislation, such as Law 13/1989, of 26 May 1989, on Credit 
cooperatives; Law 1/1994, of 11 March 1994, on the legal framework for mutual guarantee 
societies; Law 41/1999 of 12 November 1999 on payment and securities settlement 
systems; and Law 5/2005, of 22 April 2005, on supervision of financial conglomerates 
and amending other financial sector laws.
Lastly, it repeals a wide range of other regulatory provisions, including some that to date 
had been basic pillars of the regulation of credit institutions in Spain, such as the Banking 
Other amendments to the 
Securities Market Law
OTHER CHANGES
13  See “Financial regulation: 2012 Q3,” Economic Bulletin, October 2012, Banco de España, pp. 96-100.
14  See “Financial regulation: 2013 Q4,” Economic Bulletin, January 2014, Banco de España, pp. 71-74.
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Law of 31 December 1946; Law 13/1985, of 25 May 1985, on investment ratios, own funds 
and reporting obligations of financial intermediaries; and Law 26/1988, of 29 July 1988, on 
Discipline and intervention in credit institutions.
Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17) of 16 April 2014 has been published (OJ L of 
14 May 2014) (hereinafter the Regulation), establishing the framework of cooperation 
within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) between the ECB and the National 
Competent Authorities (NCAs). It also implemented certain aspects of Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2013 of the Council of 15 October 2013 establishing the basis of the SSM comprising 
the ECB and the NCAs in the participating Member States.15
The Regulation came into force on 15 May 2014, with the following timetable of application: 
by 4 September 2014 the ECB will address a decision to each supervised entity regarding 
the assumption of its functions under the SSM Regulation to confirm their significant 
nature. In the case of entities belonging to a significant supervised group, the ECB will 
notify the supervised entity at the highest level of consolidation within the participant 
Member States and ensure that all the supervised entities in the significant supervised 
group are informed. These decisions will take effect as of 4 November 2014.
If the ECB starts to perform the functions entrusted to it before 4 November 2014 it will 
inform the entity concerned and the relevant NCAs of its decision. Unless otherwise stated, 
the decision will take effect as of the time of notification. The relevant NCAs will be informed 
in advance, as soon as possible, of the intention to adopt a decision of this kind.
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 stipulates that the ECB, in consultation with the NCAs and on the 
basis of a proposal from the Supervisory Board, is to adopt and publish a framework organising 
the practical arrangements for cooperation between the ECB and the NCAs within the SSM.
The respective supervisory responsibilities of the ECB of the NCAs in the SSM are 
assigned according to the degree of significance of the supervised institutions (hereinafter, 
the Institutions)16 falling within their scope. Thus, the ECB has direct supervisory 
competences over significant institutions or groups of institutions established in 
participating Member States, including branches established in these States that belong 
to credit institutions from third countries. For their part, the NCAs are responsible for 
direct supervision of less significant entities, without prejudice to the power of the ECB to 
decide in specific cases to directly supervise these institutions when necessary in order 
to apply supervisory rules consistently.
The main features of the Regulation are enlarged upon below.
The Regulation develops and specifies in greater detail the cooperation procedures 
established in Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 between the ECB and the NCAs within the 
ECB: framework for 
cooperation in the single 
supervisory mechanism
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
15  The participating Member States are the members of the euro area and those other Member States that have 
established close cooperation, in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. Accordingly, 
the Member States concerned must undertake, inter alia, to: 1) ensure that the competent national authority 
complies with the guidance or requests issued by the ECB; 2) provide full information on credit institutions 
established in its territory that the ECB may require in order to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of these 
entities; and 3) adopt any measures requested by the ECB in relation to credit institutions.
16  All of the following are considered supervised entities in a participating Member State: 1) credit institutions; 2) 
financial holding companies; 3) mixed portfolio financial holding companies, when certain conditions are met; 
or 4) a branch established in a participating Member State belonging to a credit institution established in a non-
participating Member State.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 43 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY-AUGUST 2014 FINANCIAL REGULATION: 2014 Q2
SSM, to ensure this mechanism works efficiently and consistently. To this end, it establishes 
a wide range of regulations, covering, among other points:
1)  The framework provisions for organising the practical application of 
cooperation within the SSM, specifying the detailed procedure for evaluating 
and reviewing the extent to which a supervised entity is significant.
2)  Cooperation and exchange of information between the ECB and the NCAs 
regarding the procedures concerning significant supervised entities and less 
significant supervised entities. In particular, the common procedures applying 
to authorisations to take up the business of a credit institution, withdrawals of 
such authorisations and the assessment of acquisitions and disposals of 
qualifying holdings.
3)  The procedures for cooperation between the ECB, the NCAs and the national 
designated authorities (NDAs) regarding macro-prudential tasks and tools, 
and procedures for close cooperation between these institutions.
4)  The procedures applicable to the ECB’s and the NCAs’ sanctioning powers 
within the SSM in relation to the tasks entrusted to the ECB.
As indicated in Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, a supervised entity will be classed as 
significant based on the following criteria: 1) its size; 2) its economic importance for the 
European Union or any participating Member State; 3) the significance of its cross-border 
activities; 4) any request for direct public financial assistance under the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) or its receiving such assistance; and 5) the fact that it is one of the three 
most significant credit institutions in the participant Member State. The Regulation now 
enlarges upon the methodology for the application of these criteria.
Supervision of significant and less significant supervised entities
In general, significant supervised entities will be supervised directly by the ECB, unless 
there are particular circumstances justifying their direct supervision by the NCA. For 
their part, NCAs will provide assistance to the ECB in the performance of its tasks, 
carrying out the following activities in particular: 1) they will submit draft decisions 
regarding significant supervised entities in their Member State to the ECB; 2) they will 
assist the ECB on the preparation and application of all acts regarding the exercise of 
the tasks conferred on the ECB, including assistance in verification activities and the 
daily evaluation of the situation of significant supervised entities; and 3) they will assist 
in the enforcement of its decisions.
If the ECB decides to assume the direct supervision of a supervised institution or 
supervised group, or decides to cease supervising it, the ECB and the relevant NCA will 
cooperate to ensure the smooth transition of supervisory competences. In particular, a 
report setting out the supervisory history and risk profile of the supervised entity will be 
prepared by the relevant NCA when the ECB assumes the direct supervision of a 
supervised entity, and by the ECB when the relevant NCA becomes competent to 
supervise the entity concerned.
In general, competence for supervision of less significant supervised entities or groups lies 
with the NCA of the participating Member State, although the ECB may, at any time, 
Determining whether 
a supervised entity is 
significant or less 
significant
Significant entities
Less significant entities
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decide to directly supervise such entities when it considers this necessary in order to 
ensure the consistent application of strict supervision standards.17
In any event, NCAs must inform the ECB of their main supervision procedures applied to 
less significant supervised entities, in particular: procedures for the dismissal of members 
of the governing bodies of less significant supervised entities and the appointment of 
special executives assuming the management of such entities, and any other procedures 
they consider relevant, or which may have a negative effect on the SSM’s reputation.
The ECB will publish a list giving the name of each entity and group directly supervised by 
it. If the significance of an entity derives from its size, the list will include the total value of 
the assets of the supervised institution or group. It will also publish a list of those supervised 
entities which, although they meet some of the classification criteria for them to be 
considered a significant entity, are classed as less significant due to their specific 
circumstances and, consequently, are not directly supervised by the ECB. In this case, the 
name of each entity supervised by an NCA will be given, together with the name of the 
corresponding NCA.
By 4 August 2014, the NCAs will inform the ECB of the identity of the credit institutions and 
submit a report on these institutions in the form specified by the ECB.
Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 provides for close cooperation and information exchange 
between the ECB and the NCAs through various common procedures applicable to 
supervised entities. These include most notably: request for authorisation to take up the 
activity of a credit institution, and its withdrawal; verification that the acquisition of 
qualifying shareholdings complies with the conditions laid down in national and European 
Union legislation; and the procedure for the exchange of information and cooperation in 
relation to the use of macroprudential instruments18 by both the NCAs and ECB.
The Regulation also envisages procedures for the freedom of establishment and provision 
of services by supervised institutions in other participating Member States or in third 
countries, and the procedure whereby entities belonging to third countries can conduct 
their business in Member States participating in the SSM.
To exercise the freedom of establishment and provision of services by supervised entities 
in other participating Member States or in third countries it is necessary only to inform the 
ECB (in the case of significant entities) or the corresponding NCA (in the case of less 
significant entities). If no decision to the contrary is made, the branch may be established 
LIST OF SUPERVISED ENTITIES
COOPERATION AND 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
BETWEEN THE ECB AND NCAs 
CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY BY 
SUPERVISED INSTITUTIONS
17  Before making this decision the ECB will take the following factors into account: 1) whether the less significant 
supervised entity or group is close to fulfilling any of the criteria for it to be classified as a significant entity; 2) 
the interconnection between the less significant supervised entity or group and other credit institutions; 3) if the 
less significant credit institution is a subsidiary of a supervised entity that has its head office in a non-
participating Member State or a third country and has established one or a number of subsidiaries that are also 
credit institutions, or one or more branches in participating Member States of which one or more are significant; 
and 4) that the less significant supervised entity or group have directly or indirectly asked for or received 
financial assistance from the ESM or European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).
18  Macroprudential instruments include any of the following: 1) capital buffers regulated in Directive 2013/36/EU, 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 26 June 2013, as capital conservation buffers; 2) each entity’s 
specific countercyclical capital buffer and the buffer against systemic risks; 3) measures applicable to credit 
institutions authorised in the Member State itself, or a subset of these entities, in relation to the macroprudential 
or systemic risk observed in this State in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, of 26 June 2013; and 4) any other measure intended to correct systemic or 
macroprudential risks adopted by NCAs under the terms of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/
EU and subject to its procedures in the cases expressly envisaged in the applicable European Union legislation.
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and start business or the entity may exercise its freedom to provide services. In both 
cases, the ECB will perform the tasks of the competent authority of the Member State of 
origin in the case of significant institutions, and the corresponding NCAs shall do so in the 
case of less significant entities.
The procedure for the exercise of the freedom of establishment and provision of services 
in participating Member States by entities from third countries is similar to the above 
(notification is sufficient). In the case of establishment by the opening of branches, the 
ECB (in the case of branches of significant entities) or the NCA of the host Member State 
(for less significant entities) will have two months from the receipt of the notification to 
supervise the branch, and where necessary, the conditions under which the branch may 
conduct its business in the host Member State will be stated.
The administrative sanctions envisaged are of two types: 1) financial penalties, which may 
be of up to twice the amount corresponding to the profits obtained or losses avoided as a 
result of the non-compliance, if these are quantifiable, or up to 10% of the total annual 
volume of business; and 2) the penalty payments established in Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 
of the Council, of 23 November 1998 on the powers of the ECB to impose sanctions (the 
former have an upper limit of €500,000 and the latter are periodic penalty payments up to 
a maximum of €10,000 per day of infringement, for up to a maximum period of six months).
The ECB is empowered to impose penalty payments on significant entities, and on less 
significant supervised entities in those cases in which the relevant ECB regulations or decisions 
impose obligations upon these entities vis-à-vis the ECB. The penalty payments will be 
effective and proportionate up to the maximum limits specified in Regulation (EC) 2532/98.
The Regulation also establishes the procedures for the imposing of administrative 
sanctions on supervised entities other than penalty payments (financial penalties).
The Regulation also encompasses a variety of new features, such as: 1) a set of general 
provisions applicable to the operation of the SSM and in particular, those the ECB is to 
apply in order to conduct a supervision procedure, together with the obligations of NCAs 
to cooperate and exchange information; 2) the procedure for the additional supervision of 
financial conglomerates, in which the ECB will assume the task of coordinator in 
accordance with the criteria established in EU legislation regarding significant supervised 
entities and NCAs with regard to less significant entities; and 3) the powers of the ECB to 
access information, submission of information, on-site inspections and investigations of 
significant supervised entities, also including that of less significant entities if the ECB so 
decides in virtue of its prerogatives under the Regulation.
Guideline ECB/2014/10, 12 March 2014 (OJ L of 5 June 2014),19 was published, coming 
into force on 26 May 2014; together with Guideline ECB/2014/12, 12 March 2014 (OJ L 
5 June 2014),20 coming into force on 1 April 2014, and Decision ECB/2014/11, 12 March 2014 
(OJ L of 5 June 2014),21 which came into force on 1 April 2014. Resolution of 14 May 2014 
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
OTHER CHANGES
ECB: amendment to the 
guidelines on monetary 
policy instruments and 
procedures of the 
Eurosystem
19  Guideline ECB/2014/10 of 12 March 2014 amending Guideline ECB/2011/14 on monetary policy instruments 
and procedures of the Eurosystem.
20  Guideline ECB/2014/12 of 12 March 2014 amending Guideline ECB/2013/4 on additional temporary measures 
relating to Eurosystem refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral and amending Guideline ECB/2007/9 
of 1 August 2007, on monetary, financial institutions and markets statistics.
21  Decision ECB/2014/11 of 12 March 2014 on additional temporary measures relating to Eurosystem refinancing 
operations and eligibility of collateral.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 46 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY-AUGUST 2014 FINANCIAL REGULATION: 2014 Q2
of the Executive Commission of the Banco de España (BOE of 23 May 2014) was published, 
amending the Resolution of 11 December 1998 approving the general conditions applicable 
to the Banco de España’s monetary policy operations, in order to incorporate the changes 
introduced by Guideline ECB/2014/10, which came into force on 26 May 2014.
The main points are summarised below.
Guideline ECB/2014/10 introduces significant improvements to the Eurosystem’s 
correspondent central banking model (CCBM). Firstly, it eliminates the repatriation 
requirement, which required Eurosystem counterparties to transfer assets due to be used 
as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations to the respective issuer’s securities 
settlement system (SSS) prior to mobilising them. To replace this mechanism, a new 
channel for mobilisation combining the CCBM with links between SSSs22 will be created, 
whereby any SSS or eligible link may be used by any Eurosystem counterparty to mobilise 
eligible assets as Eurosystem collateral. The elimination of this requirement was applicable 
from 26 May 2014, the date on which the Guideline came into effect.
Guideline ECB/2014/10 introduces the concept of triparty agents (TPAs), which provide 
triparty collateral management services. As of 29 September 2014, Eurosystem 
counterparties may use Eurosystem-approved TPAs to provide cross-border collateral. 
This type of service allows entities to increase or decrease the amount of collateral they 
supply to the National Central Bank (NCB) of which they are a counterparty. Where a 
Member State’s central securities depositary (CSD) provides this service (TPA), the State’s 
NCB will act as the Correspondent Central Bank (CCB) for the NCBs of other Member 
States whose counterparties have requested the use of these services.
The eligibility requirements for asset-backed securities to be used in monetary policy 
transactions include, inter alia, that they must be backed by cash-flow generating assets 
that the Eurosystem considers to be homogeneous, such as residential mortgages; 
commercial real estate mortgages; loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises; auto 
loans; consumer finance loans; or leasing receivables. Guideline ECB/2014/10 now also 
includes credit card receivables in this list of assets.
As regards the additional temporary measures concerning Eurosystem financing 
transactions,23 certain asset-backed securities are allowed to be considered temporarily 
eligible if they have two ratings of at least triple B on their issue date and on any subsequent 
date, and they meet certain additional requirements. In line with Guideline ECB/2014/10, 
Guideline ECB/2014/12 now includes credit card receivables in its list of assets that serve 
as collateral for these bonds. Finally, it revises the mapping of certain credit ratings in the 
context of the Eurosystem harmonised rating scale.
A number of ECB Guidelines and Decisions were published, namely: Guideline ECB/2014/9, 
20 February 2014 (OJ L 28 May 2014), on domestic asset and liability management 
operations by the national central banks, amended by Guideline ECB/2014/22, 5 June 
CORRESPONDENT CENTRAL 
BANKING MODEL
TRIPARTY COLLATERAL 
MANAGEMENT SERVICES
ELIGIBLE ASSET-BACKED 
SECURITIES
ECB: internal assets and 
liabilities management 
operations and limits on 
deposit remuneration
22  A link between two SSSs consists of a set of procedures and arrangements for the cross-border transfer of 
securities by means of a book-entry process. A link takes the form of an omnibus account opened by an SSS (the 
investor SSS) in another SSS (the issuer SSS). A direct link implies that no intermediary exists between the two 
SSSs. Relayed links between SSSs may also be used for the cross-border transfer of securities to the Eurosystem. 
A relayed link is a contractual and technical arrangement that allows two SSSs not directly connected to each other 
to exchange securities transactions or transfers through a third SSS acting as the intermediary.
23  The additional temporary measures regarding Eurosystem financing transactions were established by the Governing 
Council until it is considered they are no longer necessary to ensure the adequate transmission of monetary policy.
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2014 (OJ L 7 June 2014); Guideline ECB/2014/25, 5 June 2014 (OJ L 7 June 2014), 
amending Guideline ECB/2012/27, 5 December 2012, on a Trans-European Automated 
Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET2), which came into force on 
30 May 2014; Decision ECB/2014/8, 20 February 2014 (OJ L 28 May 2014), on the 
prohibition of monetary financing and the remuneration of government deposits by national 
central banks, which came into force on 28 May 2014, and Decision ECB/2014/23, 5 June 
2014 (OJ L 7 June 2014), on the remuneration of deposits, balances and holdings of 
excess reserves, which came into force on 7 June 2014.
Guideline ECB/2014/9 and Guideline ECB/2014/22 are due to be adopted by National 
Central Banks (NCBs) by 1 December 2014. Guideline ECB/2014/25 is to be adopted by 
NCBs as of six weeks from 28 May 2014, when it came into force.
The main changes brought by these new instruments are summarised below.
A general threshold of €200 million has been set for aggregate net daily operations above 
which euro area NCBs may not conduct operations without the prior authorisation of the 
ECB. Additionally, the ECB may set and apply other thresholds for cumulative purchases 
or sales of NCB assets and liabilities during a given period of time.
In relation to repurchase agreements (repos)24 with non-Eurosystem national central banks, 
as well as being subject to the general threshold, they are subject to the prior approval of 
the Governing Council of the ECB, which will seek to fulfil the requests from NCBs on the 
basis of the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination.
The concept of deposit facility is defined to mean a Eurosystem standing facility which 
counterparties may use to make overnight deposits with an NCB at the pre-determined 
deposit rate. The remuneration on fixed-term deposits and the deposit facility may be a 
positive, negative or 0% interest rate.
Remuneration of government deposits will be subject to the following limits: 1) the 
unsecured overnight market rate in the case of overnight deposits; and 2) the secured 
market rate or, if unavailable, the unsecured overnight market rate, in the case of fixed-
term deposits.
A threshold of €200 million or 0.04% of the Member State’s GDP is also set, above which 
all overnight or fixed-term government deposits will be remunerated at a rate of 0% or the 
deposit facility rate if lower, i.e. negative, if the Governing Council of the ECB25 so decides.
Government deposits associated with the European Union and International Monetary 
Fund financial assistance programmes, and other analogous programmes, held in 
accounts with NCBs are not subject to the threshold but will be subject to the remuneration 
rates for overnight deposits and fixed-term deposits referred to above or 0% if the relevant 
threshold is exceeded.
DOMESTIC ASSET AND LIABILITY 
MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
LIMITS ON REMUNERATION OF 
DEPOSITS
Remuneration of government 
deposits 
24  In a repurchase agreement one party agrees to purchase from (or sell to) the other party securities denominated 
in euro against payment of an agreed price in euro on the trade date, with a simultaneous agreement to sell to 
(or purchase from) the other party equivalent securities against payment of another agreed price in euro at the 
maturity date.
25  On 5 June 2014 the Governing Council set a deposit facility rate of -0.1% applicable as of 11 June.
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TARGET2 balances, i.e. in the Payments Module accounts and their sub-accounts,26 
will be remunerated at 0% or at the deposit facility rate if lower, unless they are used to 
maintain minimum reserves. In such cases, remuneration of the holdings of minimum 
reserves will be governed by Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of the Council of 23 November 
1998 on the application of minimum reserves and Regulation (EC) No 1745/2003 
(ECB/2003/9) of 12 September 2003, on the application of minimum reserves. Reserves 
that exceed the minimum required will be remunerated at 0% or at the deposit facility 
rate, if lower.
Regulation (EU) No 469/2014 (ECB/2014/18) of 16 April 2014 has been published (OJ L of 
14 May 2014) (hereinafter the Regulation), amending Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 
(ECB/1994/4) on the competences of the ECB to impose sanctions.
Under Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999, the ECB is empowered to impose sanctions within 
the scope of its central bank competences, in particular, implementing euro area monetary 
policy, operating payment systems, and collecting statistical information. It should be 
noted that these powers have nothing to do with those established in Regulation (EU) 
No 1024/2013 of the Council and in Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17), given 
that these derive from its supervisory tasks.
The aim of the Regulation is to establish a consistent framework for the imposing of 
sanctions in both areas of competences.
The main new feature is the creation of an investigation unit that will carry out its tasks in 
coordination with the Executive Board and the Governing Council of the ECB. Once the 
infringement proceedings have concluded, if the investigation unit or the NCB consider 
that a sanction should be imposed on the entity concerned, a proposal will be submitted 
to the Executive Board stating the amount of the sanction to be imposed. The Executive 
Board, having seen the complete dossier, will make its decision, stating whether or not the 
entity has committed an infringement, and if so, specify the sanction that is to be imposed, 
which may (or may not) be the same as that proposed.
The Regulation came into force on 15 May 2014.
The Rules of Procedure of the Supervisory Board of the ECB (OJ L 12 June 2014), and 
Decision ECB/2014/16, of 14 April 2014 (OJ L of 14 June 2014), concerning the 
establishment of an Administrative Board of Review and its Operating Rules, complementing 
the ECB’s Rules of Procedure.
Inter alia, this regulates: 1) regular meetings of the Supervisory Board, which may be held 
by teleconferencing, unless three members are opposed; 2) attendance of meetings of the 
Supervisory Board, which will be limited to its members, and where the competent national 
authority is not the national central bank (NCB), a representative of the latter; 3) organisation 
of meetings of the Supervisory Board; 4) the voting system, such that representatives of 
the authorities in each participating Member State are jointly considered to have just one 
vote; 5) calling meetings in urgent cases, and 6) delegating powers of the Board to the 
chair or vice-chair to take clearly defined management or administrative measures. 
Other remuneration
ECB: powers to impose 
sanctions as central bank 
ECB: Rules of procedure 
of the Supervisory Board 
and the Administrative 
Board of Review
SUPERVISORY BOARD
26  The payments module account (PM account) means an account held by a TARGET2 participant in the PM with 
a Eurosystem CB which is necessary for such TARGET2 participant to: 1) process payment orders or receive 
payments via TARGET2, and 2) settle payments with the Eurosystem central bank.
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Additionally, under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the Steering Committee of the 
Supervisory Board is established, which will be in charge of preparing its meetings. 
The Rules of Procedure came into force on 1 April 2014.
Under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 the ECB will establish an 
Administrative Board of Review for the purposes of carrying out an internal administrative 
review of the decisions taken by the ECB in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by 
this Regulation, without prejudice to the right of appeal to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, in accordance with the treaties.
To this end, any individual or legal entity may request that the Administrative Board of 
Review examine an ECB decision addressed to them, or which is of a direct and individual 
concern to them. A request for review shall not have suspensory effect. However, the 
Governing Council, on a proposal by the Administrative Board of Review may, if it 
considers that circumstances so require, suspend the application of the contested 
decision. After ruling on the admissibility of the review, the Administrative Board of Review 
will express an opinion and, where appropriate, remit the case for preparation of a new 
draft decision to the Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board will take the opinion of 
the Administrative Board of Review into account and promptly submit a new draft decision 
to the Governing Council. Unless the Governing Council objects, the new draft decision 
will abrogate the initial decision, replace it with a decision of identical content, or replace 
it with an amended decision.
The Decision came into effect on 15 June 2014.
Decision ECB/2014/6 of 24 February 2014 (OJ L of 8 February 2014), on the organisation 
of preparatory measures for the collection of granular credit data by the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB), was published.
Granular credit data comprise individual items of information about the credit exposures 
of credit institutions or other loan-providing financial institutions vis-à-vis borrowers. 
Subject to adequate confidentiality safeguards, these data may be collected on a borrower-
by-borrower or loan-by-loan basis from credit registers operated by the national central 
banks (NCBs) of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) (hereinafter ‘central credit 
registers’ or ‘CCRs’), or from other granular data sources or alternative statistical 
collections.
Granular credit data are necessary for: 1) the development and production of new ESCB 
statistics in areas such as statistics on impaired assets, provisioning for impaired assets 
and revaluation reserves, and statistics on loans to non-financial corporations, broken 
down by the size of the corporations concerned; and 2) enhancing the quality of existing 
ESCB statistics in areas such as statistics on credit lines broken down by counterparty 
sector, on loans to non-financial corporations, broken down by economic activity, and on 
loans backed by real-estate collateral.
These new or improved statistics are necessary for the performance of Eurosystem tasks 
including monetary policy analysis and monetary policy operations, risk management, 
financial stability surveillance and research, and the Eurosystem’s contribution to the 
smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system.
Administrative Board 
of Review
ESCB: collection of 
granular credit data
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The purpose of the Decision is to establish the necessary preparatory measures27 so as to 
gradually implement a general long-term framework for the compilation of granular credit 
data based on harmonised ECB statistical reporting requirements. Before the end of 2016 
this long-term framework will include: 1) national granular credit databases operated by all 
Eurosystem NCBs; and 2) a common granular credit database shared by all Member 
States whose currency is the euro.
The Decision came into effect on 8 April 2014.
Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 April 2014 
(OJ L of 12 June 2014) has been published (hereinafter, the Directive), introducing a 
number of amendments to Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, of 30 May 1994, on deposit guarantee schemes, which it repealed (together with 
its successive amendments) in order to recast the legislation on the subject in a single text.
This Directive came into effect on 2 July 2014, and Member States have been given until 
3 July 2015 to implement it in their legal systems. However, if, after an exhaustive review, the 
competent authorities decide that a deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) is not in a position to 
comply with the provisions of the Directive on this date (particularly as regards the 
contributions made by its members), the entry into force of the national provision by which 
the Directive’s content is implemented may be postponed until 31 May 2016 at the latest.
The main changes are the following:
The Directive’s main aim is to ensure that a uniform level of protection is provided for 
depositors throughout the European Union while ensuring DGSs have the same level of 
stability.28 Each Member State is therefore required to ensure that one or more DGSs are 
implemented and officially recognised in their territory, and no credit institution authorised 
in one Member State may receive deposits unless it is a member of an officially recognised 
DGS in its Member State of origin.
Additionally, the Directive envisages the possibility of DGSs from different Member States 
merging or the creation of cross-border DGSs. Approval of such DGSs will be gained from 
the Member States in which the DGSs concerned are established. Cross-border DGSs will 
be supervised by representatives of the designated authorities of the Member States 
where the affiliated credit institutions are authorised.
Finally, the possibility of recognising institutional protection systems (IPSs) as DGSs is 
provided for if they meet the criteria set in the Directive.
As in the previous Directive, Member States are to guarantee that the first €100,000 of 
each depositor’s aggregate deposits per entity are covered. As well as the deposits 
European Union: deposit 
guarantee schemes
GENERAL OBJECTIVES 
OF THE DIRECTIVE
LEVEL OF COVERAGE
27  The preparatory measures that are to be applied are to include, inter alia: 1) identifying relevant user needs and 
estimating related costs generated by proposals for the collection, quality assurance and data sharing 
procedures to be applied in the long term; 2) defining the bounds of layers or strata in the borrower population 
and the other possible breakdowns; 3) the level of detail of the data attributes and the quality of granular data 
collected; 4) organising the transmission of granular credit data and setting the quality standards which granular 
credit data obtained from CCRs or other credit registers need to comply with prior to the commencement of 
such transmission; and 5) developing detailed operational arrangements specifying transmission, compilation, 
storage and use of the granular credit data that are to be tested and fine-tuned in the preparatory phase with a 
view to their subsequent incorporation into the general framework.
28  Directive 94/19/EC was based on the principle of minimum harmonisation, which gave rise to DGSs with very 
different characteristics.
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considered eligible by the Directive, Member States may guarantee that certain additional 
deposits are covered up to these levels of coverage. Similarly, they may guarantee amounts 
in excess of this level of coverage for a period of not less than three months, but not longer 
than twelve months, in the case of certain deposits, such as those from private transactions 
involving residential property or those which fulfil a social function established in the 
national legislation.
The Directive establishes that DGSs will ensure that the reimbursed amount is available 
within seven days of the date on which: 1) a competent administrative authority has 
determined that the credit institution is, for reasons directly related to its financial situation, 
unable to repay deposits and does not appear to have prospects of being able to do so; 
or 2) a judicial authority has adopted a decision, for reasons directly related to the credit 
institution’s financial circumstances, that have the effect of suspending depositors’ right to 
make claims against the institution.
However, the Directive establishes a transitional period up to 31 December 2023 for 
compliance with the maximum reimbursement period.
DGSs will raise the available financial means by levying contributions from their members 
at least annually. This will not prevent them obtaining additional financing from other 
sources. Member States shall ensure that, by 3 July 2024 (although exceptionally, this 
could be extended for a further four years), the available financial means of a DGS shall at 
least reach a target level of 0.8 % of the value of its members’ covered deposits.
If, after the target level has been reached for the first time, the available financial means 
have been reduced to less than two-thirds of the target level, the regular contribution shall 
be set at a level allowing the target level to be reached within six years.
DGSs’ financial resources will be used primarily to repay depositors. However, Member 
States, may allow a DGS to use the available financial means for alternative measures in 
order to prevent the failure of a credit institution provided that certain conditions are met.
DGSs will cover the depositors at branches set up by their member credit institutions in 
other Member States. Such depositors will be reimbursed by a DGS in the host Member 
State on behalf of the DGS in the home Member State. The DGS of the home Member 
State will provide the necessary funding prior to payout and will compensate the DGS of 
the host Member State for the costs incurred.
Finally, the Directive authorises Members States to allow DGSs to lend to other DGSs 
within the European Union on a voluntary basis, provided that certain conditions are met.
Member States shall ensure that credit institutions make available to actual and intending 
depositors the information necessary for the identification of the DGSs of which the 
institution and its branches are members within the Union. They will also ensure that credit 
institutions inform actual and intending depositors of the applicable exclusions from DGS 
protection. Confirmation that deposits are eligible for coverage will be provided to 
depositors on their statements of account including a reference to the information sheet 
set out in Annex I of the Directive. The information sheet set out in Annex I is to be provided 
to depositors at least annually. The website of the DGS is to give the necessary information 
for depositors, in particular information concerning the provisions regarding the conditions 
of deposit guarantees and the procedures involved as envisaged under this Directive.
REIMBURSEMENT 
FINANCING OF DGSs
USE OF FUNDS AND CROSS-
BORDER ISSUES
DEPOSITOR INFORMATION
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Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 
of 12 June 2014) (hereinafter, the Directive), was published, creating a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (hereinafter, the 
entities), amending Directive 82/891/EEC of the Council, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 
2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) no. 1093/2010 and (EU) no. 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council.
Member States shall adopt and publish before 31 December 2014 the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive, which are to be 
applicable as of 1 January 2015.
The Directive establishes a uniform framework of rules and procedures for the recovery 
and resolution, inter alia, of the following types of entities: 1) entities established in the 
European Union; 2) financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies and 
mixed activity holding companies established in the European Union; and 3) branches of 
entities established outside the European Union, in accordance with the specific conditions 
established in the Directive.
It establishes three levels of management: 1) preparation of recovery and resolution plans 
to restore the entity’s financial position following a significant or sudden deterioration; 2) 
application of early intervention and recovery measures envisaged for viable entities that 
are breaching or are likely to breach the solvency, liquidity, organisational structure or 
internal control requirements, and 3) the orderly resolution of entities, envisaged for credit 
institutions that are failing or where it is reasonably foreseeable that they will fail in the 
near future.
Institutions must prepare and regularly update recovery plans that set out the measures 
they are to take to restore their financial situation following a significant deterioration. 
Institutions are to submit their plans to the competent authorities for a full assessment, 
including whether the plans are comprehensive and could feasibly restore an institution’s 
viability, in a timely manner, even in periods of severe financial stress. 
These measures are envisaged so they can be applied by the competent authorities when 
an institution infringes the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 
2013/36/EU, or is likely to do so in the near future, as a consequence of a rapidly 
deteriorating financial situation, including deteriorating liquidity, increasing leverage, non-
performing loans or exposure concentration, as assessed on the basis of a set of triggers. 
In cases where the early intervention measures are insufficient to halt the institution’s 
deterioration, the competent authorities may require the removal of the senior management or 
management body of the institution, in its entirety or with regard to individuals. The competent 
authorities may also appoint one or more temporary administrators to the institution, either to 
work temporarily with the management body of the institution or to replace it. 
The framework the Directive puts in place provides for timely entry into resolution before a 
financial institution is balance-sheet insolvent. Resolution should be initiated when a 
competent authority (NCA),29 after consulting a national resolution authority (NRA), 
European Union: 
restructuring and 
resolution of credit 
institutions and 
investment firms
RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION 
PLANS
EARLY INTERVENTION 
MEASURES
RESOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS.
General rules
29  Exceptionally, this capacity is also conferred upon NRAs.
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determines that an institution is failing or likely to fail30 and alternative measures as 
specified in this Directive would not prevent such a failure within a reasonable timeframe, 
and there would be a public interest in placing the institution under resolution and applying 
resolution tools rather than resorting to normal insolvency proceedings.
The objectives of resolution are: 1) to ensure the continuity of critical functions; 2) to avoid 
a significant adverse effect on the financial system, in particular by preventing contagion, 
including to market infrastructures, and by maintaining market discipline; 3) to protect 
public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support; 4) to protect 
depositors covered by Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 April 2014 (discussed above) and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor-compensation 
schemes; and 5) to protect customers’ funds and assets.
The resolution tools envisaged in the Directive are: 1) sale of the business, i.e. the transfer 
to a purchaser of the set of assets, liabilities, shares or other equity instruments of the 
institution being resolved; 2) creation of a bridge bank or one or more asset management 
vehicles31 by the timely separation of balance sheet items—these bridge asset management 
companies will administer the assets that have been transmitted in such a way as to 
maximise their value when they are ultimately sold or undergo orderly liquidation— and, 3) 
internal recapitalisation through the repayment of capital or conversion of debt instruments 
into capital. Together with this, additional recovery and resolution measures will be 
developed to complement the internal recapitalisation, and the participation of Member 
States in an institution’s internal recapitalisation by providing it with capital will be limited.
In order to ensure that all institutions operating in the European Union can access equally 
effective resolution financing mechanisms and that the stability of the internal market is 
preserved, the establishment of a European system of financing arrangements is envisaged. 
This will consist of:
Member States will establish one or more financing mechanisms to ensure the effective 
application by NRAs of the resolution tools and powers provided in the Directive, which 
must have appropriate financial resources available. In this regard, Member States are to 
ensure that, by 31 December 2024, the available financial means of their financing 
arrangements reach at least 1% of the amount of covered deposits of all the institutions 
authorised in their territory. Member States may set target levels in excess of that amount. 
Resolution tools
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF 
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS
National financing mechanisms 
for resolution procedures
30  An institution is considered to be failing or likely to fail if one or more of the following circumstances arise: 1) the 
institution infringes or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the near 
future, infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the 
authorisation by the competent authority including but not limited to the institution’s having incurred or being 
likely to incur losses that will deplete all or a significant amount of its own funds; 2) the assets of the institution 
are or there are objective elements to support a determination that the assets of the institution will, in the near 
future, be less than its liabilities; 3) the institution is or there are objective elements to support a determination 
that the institution will, in the near future, be unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due; 4) 
extraordinary public financial support is required except when, in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State and preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any 
of the following forms: a State guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks according to the 
central banks’ conditions; a State guarantee of newly issued liabilities; or an injection of own funds or purchase 
of capital instruments at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution.
31  For the purposes of asset separation, an asset management vehicle is a legal person that meets the following 
requirements: 1) it is wholly or partly owned by one or more public authorities (which may include the resolution 
authority or the resolution financing arrangement) and is controlled by the resolution authority; and 2) it has 
been created for the purpose of receiving some or all of the assets, rights and liabilities of one or more 
institutions under resolution or a bridge institution.
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This initial period of time may be extended for a maximum of four years if the financing 
arrangements have made cumulative disbursements in excess of 0.5% of covered 
deposits32 of all the institutions authorised in their territory.
Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction may 
make a request to borrow from all other financing arrangements within the European 
Union if the amounts raised are not sufficient to cover losses or the extraordinary ex-post 
contributions are not immediately accessible. The rate of interest, repayment period and 
other terms and conditions of the loans will be agreed between the borrowing financing 
arrangement and the other financing arrangements which have agreed to participate. The 
loan of every participating financing arrangement will have the same interest rate, 
repayment period and other terms and conditions, unless all participating financing 
arrangements agree otherwise.
Member States are to ensure that, in the case of a group resolution, the national financing 
arrangement of each institution that is part of a group contributes to the financing of the 
group resolution. Accordingly, Member States are to establish rules and procedures in 
advance to ensure that each national financing arrangement can effect its contribution 
to the financing of group resolution. Member States must also ensure that group 
financing arrangements are allowed to contract borrowings or other forms of support, 
from institutions, financial institutions or other third parties. Finally, any proceeds or 
benefits that arise from the use of the group financing arrangements are to be allocated 
to national financing arrangements in accordance with their contributions to the financing 
of the resolution.
Deposits covered by deposit guarantee schemes should not bear any losses in the 
resolution process. In this regard, deposit guarantee schemes to which an institution under 
resolution is affiliated should be required to make a contribution not greater than the 
amount of losses that they would have had to bear if the institution had been wound up 
under normal insolvency proceedings.
Where deposits at an institution under resolution are transferred to another entity through 
the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool, the depositors have no claim 
against the deposit guarantee scheme in relation to any part of their deposits at the 
institution under resolution that are not transferred, provided that the amount of funds 
transferred is equal to or more than the aggregate coverage level provided for in Directive 
2014/49/EU.
The negotiation of agreements with third countries regarding the means of cooperation 
between the resolution authorities and the relevant third-country authorities, inter alia, for 
the purpose of information sharing in connection with recovery and resolution planning in 
relation to institutions, financial institutions, parent undertakings and third-country 
institutions is envisaged.
Finally, a set of administrative sanctions and other administrative measures applicable in 
the case of noncompliance with the provisions of the Directive is envisaged, without 
prejudice to the criminal sanctions that may be provided for in Member States’ national law.
Borrowing between financing 
arrangements
Mutualisation of national 
financing arrangements in the 
case of a group resolution
USE OF DEPOSIT GUARANTEE 
SCHEMES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
RESOLUTION
OTHER CHANGES
32  Those guaranteed under Directive 2014/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
on deposit-guarantee schemes.
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A number of European Union delegated regulations have been published implementing 
the technical rules under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and 
investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and Directive 2013/36/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council.33 These are: Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 523/2014 of 12 March 2014;34 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
No 524/2014 of 12 March 2014;35 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 620/2014 
of 4 June 2014;36 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 525/2014 of 12 March 2014;37 
Commission Delegated Regulation 526/2014 of 12 March 2014;38 Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 527/2014 of 12 March 2014;39 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
No 528/2014 of 12 March 2014;40 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 529/2014 of 
12 March 2014;41 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 530/2014 of 12 March 
2014;42 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 591/2014 of 3 June 2014;43 and 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 625/2014 of 13 March 2014.44
Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 (OJ L of 12 June 2014), on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012,45 and Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
European Union: specific 
rules applicable to 
financial institutions’ own 
funds
European Union: financial 
instrument markets
33  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity 
of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC.
34  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 523/2014 of 12 March 2014 (OJ L of 20 May 2014) supplementing 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards for determining what constitutes the close correspondence between the value of an institution’s 
covered bonds and the value of the institution’s assets.
35  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 524/2014 of 12 March 2014 (OJ L of 20 May 2014) supplementing 
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards 
specifying the information that competent authorities of home and host Member States supply to one another.
36  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 620/2014 of 4 June 2014 (OJ L of 12 June 2014) laying down 
implementing technical standards with regard to information exchange between competent authorities of home 
and host Member States, according to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.
37  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 525/2014 of 12 March 2014 (OJ L of 20 May 2014) supplementing 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards for the definition of market.
38  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 526/2014 of 12 March 2014 (OJ L of 20 May 2014) supplementing 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards for determining proxy spread and limited smaller portfolios for credit valuation adjustment risk.
39  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 527/2014 of 12 March 2014 (OJ L of 20 May 2014) supplementing 
Directive (EU) No 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards specifying the classes of instruments that adequately reflect the credit quality of an institution as a 
going concern and are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration.
40  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 528/2014 of 12 March 2014 (OJ L of 20 May 2014) supplementing 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards for non-delta risk of options in the standardised market risk approach.
41  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 529/2014 of 12 March 2014 (OJ L of 20 May 2014) supplementing 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards for assessing the materiality of extensions and changes of the Internal Ratings Based Approach and 
the Advanced Measurement Approach.
42  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 530/2014 of 12 March 2014 (OJ L of 20 May 2014) supplementing 
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards further defining material exposures and thresholds for internal approaches to specific risk in the 
trading book.
43  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 591/2014 of 3 June 2014 (OJ L of 4 June 2014) on the extension 
of the transitional periods set in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council.
44  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 625/2014 of 13 March 2014 (OJ L of 13 June 2014) supplementing 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council by way of regulatory technical 
standards specifying the requirements for investor, sponsor, original lenders and originator institutions relating 
to exposures to transferred credit risk.
45  Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 June 2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories.
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Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L of 12 June 2014) have been published, on markets in 
financial instruments (commonly known as MiFID2),46 and amending Directive 2002/92/
EC,47 and Directive 2011/61/EU.48
The Regulation came into force on 2 July 2014, as of which date certain sections of it are 
applicable. The remainder will come into effect as of 3 January 2017, except in the case of 
non-discriminatory access to benchmark indices and the obligation to grant a licence, 
which will be applied as of 3 January 2019.
For its part, the Directive is to be implemented in Member States’ domestic legislation by 
3 July 2016 and is to be in force by 3 January 2017, with certain exceptions, which will 
apply as of 3 September 2018.
The Regulation applies to investment firms, credit institutions when they provide investment 
services or perform one or more investment activities, and market operators, including the 
trading venues they manage.
It establishes uniform requirements on the following points: 1) public disclosure of data on 
trading in financial instruments; 2) reporting of transactions to the competent authorities; 
3) trading of derivatives in organised venues; 4) non-discriminatory access to mechanisms 
for clearing and trading involving benchmarks; 5) intervention powers and powers on 
position management and position limits for the European Securities Markets Authority 
(ESMA) and the European Banking Authority (EBA); and 6) provision of investment services 
or activities by third-country firms following an applicable equivalence decision by the 
Commission with or without a branch.
Drawing on Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 discussed above, the Directive introduces a 
number of new features to Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 April 2004 (MiFID),49 which it will repeal when it comes into effect on 
3 January 2017.
The Directive establishes a series of requirements on: 1) authorisation and operating 
conditions for investment firms; 2) provision of investment services or activities by third-
country firms through the establishment of a branch; 3) authorisation and operation of 
regulated markets; 4) authorisation and operation of data reporting services providers; 5) 
the supervisory powers of the competent authorities; 6) cooperation between the 
competent authorities in the Member States and the ESMA; and 7) cooperation with 
third countries.
The main features of the Directive include new operating conditions for investment firms to 
bolster investor protection. In particular, investment firms are to act honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the best interests of their customers. Another change 
MAIN FEATURES OF 
REGULATION (EU) NO 600/2014 
MAIN FEATURES OF DIRECTIVE 
2014/65/EU (MiFID2)
46  The name MiFID comes from the initials of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive.
47  Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 on insurance 
mediation.
48  Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and 
(EU) No 1095/2010.
49  Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993.
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with respect to the previous legislation is that when investment firms provide investment 
advisory services they are to inform customers: 1) whether or not the advice is provided on 
an independent basis; 2) whether the advice is based on a broad or on a more restricted 
analysis of different types of financial instruments and, in particular, whether the range is 
limited to financial instruments issued or provided by entities having close links with the 
investment firm or any other legal or economic relationships, such as contractual 
relationships, so close as to pose a risk of impairing the independent basis of the advice 
provided; and 3) whether the investment firm will provide the client with a periodic 
assessment of the suitability of the financial instruments recommended to that client.
Another feature in relation to investor protection is the assessment of suitability and 
appropriateness and customer information, so as to enable the investment firm to 
recommend to clients or potential clients the investment services and financial instruments 
that are suitable for them and, in particular, are in accordance with their risk tolerance and 
ability to bear losses.
The Directive also establishes the option for the operator of a MTF to apply to its home 
competent authority to have the MTF registered as an SME growth market, which will be 
granted if certain conditions are met, one of which being that at least 50% of the issuers 
whose financial instruments are admitted to trading on the MTF are SMEs. When an 
issuer’s financial instrument has been admitted to trading on an SME growth market, the 
financial instrument may only be traded on another market of this type when the issuer has 
been informed and has not raised objections.
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation)50 (OJ L of 12 June 2014), and 
Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
(OJ L of 12 June 2014) on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive) 
were published.
The Regulation entered into force on 2 July and will apply from 3 July 2016. The Directive 
came into force on 2 July and must be transposed by Member States by 3 July 2016.
The Regulation establishes a common regulatory framework on insider dealing, the 
unlawful disclosure of inside information (which is a new development) and market 
manipulation (market abuse), as well as measures to prevent all the foregoing, to ensure 
the integrity of financial markets in the European Union and to enhance investor protection 
and confidence in those markets.
It applies to all financial instruments that are admitted to trading on a regulated market, on 
MTFs, on OTFs or only over the counter (OTC), and to any other conduct or action that can have 
an effect on those financial instruments, whether or not it takes place on a trading venue.51
The concept of inside information has been extended to refer to any of the following 
types of information: 1) information of a precise nature, which has not been made 
European Union: new 
market abuse legislation 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
REGULATION (EU) NO 596/2014
Inside information
50  Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse 
(market abuse regulation), repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 28 
January 2003, on insider dealing and market manipulation, and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/
EC and 2004/72/EC.
51  Directive 2003/6/EC focused mainly on financial instruments admitted to trading on regulated markets or for 
which a request for admission to trading on such markets had been made.
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public, relating directly or indirectly to one or more issuers or to one or more financial 
instruments or derivatives thereof, or relating directly to a related spot commodity 
contract, and which, if it were made public, could have a significant impact on the 
prices of those financial instruments or the related derivatives; and 2) information 
conveyed by a client, relating to its pending orders in financial instruments, which is of 
a precise nature, relating to one or more issuers or to one or more financial instruments 
and which, if it were made public, could have a significant impact on the prices of those 
instruments.
Unlawful disclosure of inside information arises where a person possesses inside information 
and discloses that information to any other person, except where the disclosure is made in 
the normal exercise of their employment, profession or duties. This conduct will also apply 
to any person who possesses inside information as a result of: 1) being a member of the 
administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer or emission allowance 
market participant; 2) having a holding in the capital of the issuer or emission allowance market 
participant; 3) having access to the information through the exercise of their employment, 
profession or duties; or 4) being involved in criminal activities.
Market manipulation shall comprise, among others, the following activities: 1) entering into 
a transaction that may give false or misleading signals as to the demand for or the supply 
or price of a financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract, or that may secure 
the price of one or several financial instruments or of a related spot commodity contract at 
an abnormal or artificial level; 2) entering into a transaction that may affect the price of one 
or several financial instruments, a related spot commodity contract or an auctioned 
product based on emission allowances, employing a fictitious device or any other form of 
deception or contrivance; and 3) disseminating information through the media, including 
the internet, or by any other means, which may give false or misleading signals as to the 
demand for or the supply or price of a financial instrument.
Market operators and investment firms that operate a trading venue shall establish effective 
arrangements, systems and procedures to prevent and detect insider dealing, market 
manipulation and attempted insider dealing and market manipulation and shall report 
orders and transactions, including any cancellations or modifications thereof, that could 
constitute insider dealing, market manipulation or attempted insider dealing or market 
manipulation to the competent authority of the trading venue.
Persons discharging managerial responsibilities, as well as persons closely associated 
with them, shall notify the issuers of all transactions conducted on their own account 
relating to shares or debt instruments of those issuers or to derivatives or other financial 
instruments linked thereto. They shall also notify market participants of all transactions 
conducted on their own account relating to emission allowances, auction products based 
on those allowances or derivatives relating thereto. The notification threshold established 
for these transactions is €5,000 in any calendar year; the competent authority may raise 
this threshold to €20,000, but this decision must be justified with ESMA.
Lastly, the new regulation describes in great detail the powers of the competent authorities, 
which may even suspend trading of the financial instrument concerned, and lays down a 
broad range of administrative sanctions and other administrative measures, without 
prejudice to any criminal sanctions and to the supervisory powers of the competent 
authorities of the Member States relating to any transactions or conduct that involves 
market abuse as described above.
Unlawful disclosure of inside 
information
Market manipulation
Prevention and detection of 
market abuse 
Other new developments 
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The Directive complements Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, which requires Member 
States to ensure that the appropriate administrative measures will be taken or 
administrative sanctions imposed against any persons responsible for market abuse 
violations. It will apply to: 1) financial instruments admitted to trading on a regulated 
market or for which a request for admission to trading on a regulated market has been 
made; 2) financial instruments traded on an MTF, admitted to trading on an MTF or for 
which a request for admission to trading on an MTF has been made; 3) financial 
instruments traded on an OTF; and 4) conduct and transactions relating to auctions on 
platforms authorised as regulated markets of emission allowances or other auctioned 
products based thereon, including when the auctioned products are not financial 
instruments.
The Directive establishes minimum rules for criminal sanctions for market abuse, to ensure 
the integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and 
confidence in those markets.
Council Directive 2014/48/EU of 24 March 2014 (OJ L of 15 April 2014) was published, 
amending Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest 
payments. This Directive came into effect on 15 April 2014, and Member States have been 
given until 1 January 2016 to implement it in their legal systems.
The aim of Directive 2003/48/EC was that income on savings in the form of interest paid 
in one Member State be taxable in another Member State in which the natural person who 
is the beneficial owner has his/her normal residence. To achieve this end, a general 
automatic information exchange mechanism has been set up between Member States, 
which, on a transitional basis, will make withholdings against interest payments and pay 
part of the withheld amount to the Member State in which the natural person concerned 
is resident for tax purposes. The general scheme for this automatic information exchange 
mechanism implies that so-called paying agents are obliged to supply the tax authorities 
in their Member State with certain information on these earnings, which will subsequently 
be forwarded to the tax authorities of the Member State in which the beneficial owner of 
the interest payments is resident.
Directive 2014/48/EU now aims to solve a number of the shortcomings in the preceding 
directive, such as the fact that it was possible to avoid taxation by resorting to an 
intermediary entity or legal instrument, in particular, those established in territories in which 
the taxing of the income paid is not guaranteed. It was also possible to avoid taxation by 
channelling interest payments through an economic operator established outside of the 
European Union. It also failed to cover certain financial instruments equivalent to securities 
yielding interest, or certain indirect means of holding these securities.
The main changes are set out below: 1) information regarding the identity of the beneficial 
owner has been enhanced, as the paying agent can require his/her name, address, date 
and place of birth, and also his tax identification number or equivalent allocated by the 
Member State in which he is resident for tax purposes; 2) the concept of paying agents is 
extended to other economic operators, legal entities or instruments effectively 
administered in a Member State; the concept of interest payment is expanded to include 
other forms of remuneration, such as certain categories of life insurance contracts 
containing a guarantee of income return or whose performance is at more than 40% 
linked to income from debt claims or equivalent income, and income from collective 
investment institutions (CIIs) established in the European Union or European Economic 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
DIRECTIVE 2014/57/EU
European legislation on 
the taxation of savings 
income in the form of 
interest payments
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Area (EEA)52 that are not harmonised under Directive 2009/65/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009. 
CNMV Circular 2/2014 of 23 June 2014 (BOE of 28 June 2014) was published, on the 
exercise of various regulatory options regarding the solvency of investment firms and 
their consolidable groups, contained in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013,53 on prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, which 
came into force on 29 June 2014. The opportunity was also taken to repeal CNMV 
Circular 12/2008 of 30 December 200854 on the solvency of investment firms and their 
consolidable groups.
For its part, Royal Decree Law 14/2013 of 29 November 2013 on urgent measures to adapt 
Spanish law to European Union standards on the supervision and solvency of financial 
institutions, empowered the CNMV to use the options conferred on competent national 
authorities in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 in the field of investment firms, which is the 
purpose of the Circular.
In relation to the applicable own funds requirements, pursuant to Article 465 of Regulation 
(EU) No 575/2013, as of 1 January 2014 investment firms must, at all times, comply with a 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of 4.5% and a Tier 1 capital ratio of 6%.55
The Regulation establishes a transitional period between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 
2017 in which to apply certain deductions to the components of Common Equity Tier 1, 
Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital, applying similar rules to those established for credit 
institutions by the Banco de España in CBE 2/2014 of 31 January 2014.
In the case of the capital requirements for investment firms, the exceptions envisaged in 
Article 93 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 will not be taken into account, such that the own 
funds of an investment firm cannot be less than the amount of the initial capital required at 
the time of its authorisation.
The treatment institutions are to apply for the purposes of assessing whether the activity has 
varied significantly with respect to the previous year is defined, up until the entry into force 
of the technical regulations on the topic pending approval by the European Commission. 
Certain discretionary areas associated with the calculation of own funds requirements for 
credit risk are also covered, more specifically, those relating to advanced calculation methods 
for these requirements, credit risk reduction techniques and securitisations.
As of 1 January 2014 investment firms are to include 100% of unrealised losses on assets 
or liabilities in the calculation of their Common Equity Tier 1. These losses are to be 
measured at fair value and registered on the balance sheet, excluding those deriving from 
Supervision and solvency 
of investment firms
OWN FUNDS REQUIREMENTS
ADJUSTMENTS AND PRUDENTIAL 
FILTERS IN OWN FUNDS
52  The EEA comprises the 28 countries of the European Union plus Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland.
53  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 envisages a multitude of options to be decided by the competent authorities, on 
topics as varied as its scope, the definition of own funds, the own funds requirements for various risks, major 
exposures, liquidity coverage, and transitional provisions. See “Financial regulation: 2013 Q2,” Economic 
Bulletin, July-August 2013, Banco de España, pp. 53-66.
54  See “Financial regulation: 2009 Q1,” Economic Bulletin, April 2009, Banco de España, pp. 188-193.
55  Under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Tier 1 capital is the sum of Common Equity Tier 1 (basically comprising ordinary 
capital and reserves), and additional Tier 1 capital (comprising hybrid instruments). It also establishes a series of own 
funds requirements for 2014 in the following ranges: 1) a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of between 4% and 
4.5%, and 2) a Tier 1 capital ratio of between 5.5% and 6% that must be specified by the competent authorities.
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changes in the investment firm’s own credit rating, and all other unrealised losses recorded 
in the income statement.
As of 1 January 2015 investment firms may include 100% of their unrealised gains measured 
at fair value in their calculation of Common Equity Tier 1. However, until the European 
Commission adopts the relevant regulatory technical standards, investment firms are 
allowed to continue applying the arrangements provided in CNMV Circular 12/2008 of 
30 December 2008 on the solvency of investment firms and their consolidable groups. If 
they have opted not to include any realised gains, and these gains are from debt securities 
with central government recorded at fair value as available-for-sale assets, they will have the 
option of continuing to exclude unrealised gains from these securities in their own funds.
Certain investment firms and their consolidated groups are temporarily exempted from 
compliance with the liquidity requirements established in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; the 
method investment firms are to use to determine the value of certain exposures in relation to 
counterparty risk coverage is defined; the treatment entities are to continue applying to stock 
market indices until the relevant regulatory technical standards come into effect, which are due 
to be prepared by the EBA, is defined; certain aspects of large exposures are regulated: firstly, 
the treatment of positions held in collective investment undertakings (CIU), and exemptions for 
the purposes of complying with the limits on large exposures when certain conditions are met 
are regulated, and secondly the place and deadline for investment firms’ publication of the 
solvency report, with the content envisaged in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 is specified. 
CNMV Circular 1/2014, of 26 February 2014 (BOE of 3 April 2014) has been published, on 
the internal organisation requirements and control functions of institutions providing 
financial services, coming into force on 4 April 2014.
Making use of the powers granted by Royal Decree 217/2008 of 15 February 2008,56 on 
the legal framework governing financial services firms and other institutions providing 
investment services, the Circular implements and clarifies the internal organisation 
requirements and control functions of institutions providing investment services. It also 
represents a thorough update to CNMV Circular 1/1998, of 10 June 1998, on internal 
systems for ongoing risk control, monitoring and assessment, which it repeals.
Institutions covered by the Circular have until 31 December 2014 to adapt their 
organisational structures and internal control procedures to the provisions of the circular.
Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 
2013,57 on European venture capital funds (EuVECAs), requires, inter alia, that the 
competent authority of the EuVECA’s home Member State notify the competent authorities 
of the host Member States and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) of 
the circumstances relating to the passport of EuVECA managers. It must also notify them 
when an EuVECA manager is removed from the register.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 593/2014 of 3 June 2014,58 which came 
into force on 7 June 2014, now determines that the competent authority in the EuVECA’s 
OTHER ASPECTS OF THE 
CIRCULAR
Entities providing 
investment services: 
internal organisation 
requirements and control 
functions
European venture capital 
funds: implementation of 
the regulations
56  See “Financial regulation: 2008 Q1,” Economic Bulletin, April 2008, Banco de España, pp. 11-13.
57  See “Financial regulation: 2013 Q2,” Economic Bulletin, July-August 2013, Banco de España, pp. 81-84.
58  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 593/2014 of 3 June 2014 (OJ L of 4 June 2014) laying down 
implementing technical standards with regard to the format of the notification according to Article 16(1) of 
Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on European venture capital funds.
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home Member State is to notify the competent authorities in host Member States, and the 
ESMA, by e-mail, completing the form included in the annex to this Regulation.
Royal Decree 304/2014, of 5 May 2014 (BOE of 6 May 2014) has been published, enacting 
the regulations for Law 10/2010, of 28 April 2010, on preventing money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism (hereinafter, the Regulation), repealing the previous Regulation 
enacted by Royal Decree 925/1995, of 9 June 1995. The Regulation came into force on 
6 May 2014, with the exception of certain points, which will be detailed below.
In particular, the Regulation specifies, inter alia, some of the obligations upon subjects 
under Law 10/2010;59 institutional organisation in relation to the prevention of money 
laundering and terrorist financing; international sanctions and financial countermeasures, 
and establishes the structure and functioning of the register of financial ownership.
More details of the main changes are given below:
Supervised entities will identify and confirm, using reliable documents, the identity of any 
legal or natural persons who attempt to establish business dealings or intervene in any 
occasional transactions for amounts of more than €1,000 (previously €3,000), except in 
certain cases.
The Regulation lists the documents considered reliable for the purposes of identification in more 
detail. In the case of Spanish-registered legal persons, submission by the client of a certificate 
from the Mercantile Register will be admissible for the purposes of formal identification. 
The definition of the beneficial owner introduced by Law 10/2010 is further developed, and 
further obligations relating to the identification of these beneficial owners added. 
Independently from their customer identification obligations, supervised entities must also 
identify the beneficial owner before commencing business dealings in the case of: 1) 
electronic transfers of sums of over €1,000; and 2) other occasional transactions for sums 
exceeding €15,000.
The simplified measures consist of the application of one or more of the following: 1) 
checking the identity of the customer or beneficial owner when a quantitative threshold is 
passed; 2) reducing the frequency of document reviews; 3) reducing the monitoring of the 
business relationship and scrutiny of operations that do not exceed the quantitative 
threshold; and 4) inferring the nature or purpose of the transactions from their type or the 
business relationship established rather than collecting information on the customer’s 
Preventing money 
laundering and the 
financing of terrorism
NORMAL DUE DILIGENCE 
MEASURES
IDENTIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL 
OWNERS
SIMPLIFIED DUE DILIGENCE 
MEASURES
59  Entities obliged to supervise transactions or legal acts with signs or solid evidence of involving assets of 
illicit origin are: financial institutions, payment institutions, property developers, auditors, notaries, 
registrars, casinos, lawyers and attorneys, dealers in jewels and artworks, individuals engaged in the 
business of acting as intermediaries for loans and credit, persons who, without having obtained 
authorisation as a credit finance establishment, carry out any of these activities, and persons dealing 
professionally with goods where the collections or payments are made using means of payment with 
values of over €15,000 and are made as a single transaction or a number of transactions which appear to 
be related in some way. Foreign exchange activities, among others, are excluded from the scope where 
they are conducted as a secondary activity to the owner’s main business, and when the following conditions 
are met: 1) the foreign exchange activity is verified to be solely a service provided to customers of the main 
activity; 2) the amount exchanged per customer does not exceed €1,000 in each calendar quarter 
(previously, €3,000); 3) that the foreign exchange activity is limited, in absolute terms, and may not exceed 
the figure of €100,000 a year; and 4) the foreign exchange activity is secondary to the main business, such 
that it does not exceed 5% of the annual business turnover.
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professional or business activity. The regulation also specifies what customers simplified 
due diligence measures are applicable, based on their risk.60 It also specifies the products 
or transactions to which simplified measures may be applied.61
In addition to the normal due diligence measures, supervised entities are to apply enhanced 
measures in relation to any of their business, activities, products, services, distribution or 
marketing channels, business relationships and transactions that represent a higher 
money laundering or terrorist financing risk.62 
Supervised entities are required to have suspicious transaction alerts in place. In the case 
of entities conducting over 10,000 transactions a year, automated alert generating and 
prioritising models must be implemented and subject to periodic review. Additionally, 
supervised entities should establish internal control procedures for their executives, 
employees and agents to detect operations potentially linked to money laundering or 
terrorist financing.
With regard to the monthly transactions report, supervised entities are to inform the 
Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and 
Monetary Offences (SEPBLAC, in its Spanish initials) of all the operations listed in Law 
10/2010, with the new addition of aggregate information on electronic funds transfers 
broken down by country of origin and destination and by agent or centre of activity, 
together with aggregate information on overseas electronic funds transfers by credit 
institutions, also broken down by countries of origin and destination.
Another of the new features brought in by the Regulation is the broad implementation of 
the internal control procedures, based on an ex ante risk assessment, which will be 
documented by the entity, in order to identify and evaluate the entity’s risks by customer 
type, country, geographical area, products, services, operations and distribution channels, 
taking into consideration variables such as the purpose of the business relationship, the 
customer’s asset level, volume of operations, and the regularity or duration of their 
business dealings. 
ENHANCED DUE DILIGENCE 
MEASURES
REPORTING OBLIGATIONS
INTERNAL CONTROL MEASURES
60  These include the following: 1) public law entities in Member States of the European Union or equivalent non-
EU countries; 2) corporations or legal persons controlled or majority owned by public law entities in Member 
States of the European Union or equivalent non-EU countries; 3) financial institutions, excluding payment 
institutions, established in the European Union or equivalent non-EU countries subject to supervision, whose 
purpose is to guarantee compliance with anti-money laundering and terrorist finance obligations; and 4) listed 
companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in the European Union or an 
equivalent non-EU country, and their branches or majority-owned subsidiaries.
61  These include the following: 1) life insurance policies whose annual premium does not exceed €1,000 or single 
premium does not exceed €2,500; 2) life insurance policies solely covering the risk of death; 3) electronic money 
when it cannot be recharged and the stored amount does not exceed €250 or when, if rechargeable, the total 
amount available in a year is limited to €2,500; 4) postal giros by public administrations or their dependent 
organisations and official postal giros for postal service payments with their origin and destination in the postal 
service; 5) collections or payments deriving from the commissions generated by reservations in the tourism 
sector that do not exceed €1,000; 6) consumer credit contracts for amounts less than €2,500 provided the 
reimbursement is solely by means of a current account debit; and 7) credit card contracts whose limit does not 
exceed €5,000, when the reimbursement of the amount drawn down can only be made from a current account 
in the customer’s name.
62  This applies, inter alia, to the following cases: 1) private banking services; 2) electronic funds transfer services 
for amounts of over €3,000 per quarter; 3) foreign currency exchange services for amounts of over €6,000 per 
quarter; 4) business dealings and transactions with corporations with bearer shares; 5) business dealings and 
transactions with customers in high risk countries, territories or jurisdictions or which involve the transfer of 
funds to or from such territories or jurisdictions, including, in all cases, those countries for which the FATFF 
requires the application of enhanced diligence measures; and 6) transmission of shares or holdings in pre-
established corporations, i.e. those established without a real economic activity for subsequent transfer to 
third parties.
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The register of financial ownership has been established as an administrative registry with 
the purpose of preventing and deterring money laundering and terrorist financing. The 
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and Support to Enterprise will be responsible for the 
register, with the SEPBLAC tasked with processing it on the latter’s behalf. The register will 
be supplied with information from the monthly reports63 from credit institutions on the 
opening and closing of all current accounts, savings accounts, securities accounts or 
fixed-term deposits, irrespective of the commercial name used.
Ministerial Order ECC/730/2014, of 29 April 2014 (BOE of 7 May 2014), on temporary 
measures to facilitate the progressive adaptation of insurance and reinsurance entities 
to the new framework under Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 25 November 2009,64 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of 
Insurance and Reinsurance. The Order came into effect on 8 May 2014 and will be in 
force until 31 December 2015.
During the initial preparatory phase of application of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, on the taking-up and pursuit of the 
business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II), insurance and reinsurance entities must 
adopt the necessary measures for their progressive adaptation to the guidelines on the 
system of governance, prospective internal evaluation of risks, the supply of information to 
the supervisor and prior application to use internal models, and they must submit a schedule, 
duly approved by the governing body, for the progressive implementation of its content to the 
Directorate-General for Insurance and Pension Funds (DGSFP, in its Spanish initials).
REGISTER OF FINANCIAL 
OWNERSHIP
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63  The report will contain details identifying account holders, beneficial owners, and where applicable, 
representatives or authorised signatories and any other persons authorised to operate the account, together 
with the date of opening or closure, and type of account or deposit. The identification details will be the full 
name or company name with the identity document type and number.
64  See “Financial regulation: 2009 Q4,” Economic Bulletin, January 2010, Banco de España, pp. 162-166.
